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IN THE SUPREME COURT 01 ' THE STATE Of UTAH 
SOUTHERN TITLE GUARANTY 
C0* f INC., a Texas Corporal: 3 on 
Plaintiff/ Appellai it. 
vs. Case 
GLENN 3 BETHERS and TELLA 
MAE BETHERS, husband and wit> : Category 13 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Was 1 her° competent evidence supporting 
conclusion that defendants wen e not unjust.\ e r n c h e d wnere 
defendants * ' eceived no more that what they were entitled 
to receive „;, . the trust deed note;"" 
Was there competent evidence * support the trial court's 
conclusion that plaintiff r-^d what 11 had barga ined 
for, where pi a mt.i 11 hai - i >w 1 edge- 11II tlv = E-sssei I tial 
details of the transaction yet without having previously 
ill in Hi n i j ili ill in in 11 I I n i ^ a n t s f o t in r e l e a s e o f I ::: t ] 
v o 1 u n t a r 1 1 v p j i i L11 e s m J mi I l!v i , " 11 " Ji H. Il 11 11 H I e n d a n I t s w ::i t l r ::  i i t 
pi ntpsf. or reservation of rights in exchange fo:i : a 
reconveyance of Lot 17 
I i. i » l d i n t i f f HI ill, i l 1 in i I * ike wher • = tl le 
issued was not raised below and where there Is no evi dence 
of any mistake or improper conduct on the part of 
defendanIs. 
Did defendants have any obligation, to reconvey title 
to plaintiff without ' the payment of $9,563.3 8 wiier e 
defendants' grantee was in default under the terms of 
its contract and defendants would not have been required to 
make the reconveyance under the terms of the contract? 
5. Are defendants entitled to an award of attorney's fees for 
being required to respond to this appeal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a suit on a theory of 
unjust enrichment to compel the defendants to refund the payment 
they received from plaintiff for reconveyance of a trust deed on 
property, title to which had been insured by plaintiff without 
exception for the existence of the trust deed. 
B. Summary of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court. 
Plaintiff filed this action on February 5, 1985, in the Eighth 
Circuit Court, Provo Department, seeking a refund of $9,582.60 
which plaintiff had previously paid to obtain a partial recon-
veyance of a trust deed on real property. (R. 1-4.) Defendants 
answered and counterclaimed for malicious prosecution, seeking 
damages in excess of the circuit court's jurisdiction. (R. 
11-16.) The case was thereafter transferred to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court. (R. 17.) Defendants' Counterclaim was 
dismissed (R. 99) pursuant to plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgement. (R. 24.) Defendants have not appealed from the 
dismissal of their Counterclaim. 
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The c a s e was t r i e d b e i o i o Uio Hi nur ih 11 b«-niti.]o I Mali i t , 
s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a jui , on A p r i l 17, 198<i M the c l o s e of 
p l a i n t i ff * i e v i d e n c e , r lmfendants moved for d i s m i s s a l on Mine 
ground that p l a u i L i l i had l a i JeJ I | i tnvt i IULU < il i I ion. 
fPi, 283 , ]i M t e r o r a l a rgument , t h e r o u r t g r a n t e d t h e mo t ion . 
(R. 295 . ) F i n d i n g s of Far t ind C o n c l u s i o n s of law (P TR9-93) 
dirnj on mi Iko 1 lUiGmjssal Willi Piwjinh I I l«' I M • il j WIM I- f i l t e red 
on May 2.1, IM" P l a i n t i f f f i l e d i t s N o t i c e of Appeal on June 
12, 1986, (R, 196 -97 , ) 
j t a t anient ot I* a c t s in inimn I i J In t PinJanl • nnl 
o t h e r s 1 s o l d c e r t a i n p a r c e l s of land t o Sunwest 11 Development 
C o r p o r a t i in ( s u n w e s t ) . In c o n n e c t i o n wi th t h e t r a n s a c t i o n , t h e 
p a r t i e s c * e m Lei I i « i l I t en ayi eoiiii-uil in I i ' netteia I I ieeiqe 
Agreement" ifx Ii i ami Sunwest and two of i t s p r i n c i p a l s 
e x e c u t e d a T r u s t Di*nd and a T r u s t Deed Note hack t') d e f e n d a n t s 2 
Lu s e c u r e payment- ol 1 In pui , hase> pi i ct ill " I I 
:lThe o t h e r p a r t i e s t o t h e t r a n s a c t i o n wen e Welby L. Bethei: s 
and E l l e n L. B e t h e r s , (R. 218 , Ex. 16 . ) Welby and El] ] • =s „ 
B e t h e r s were n o t , however , b e n e f i c i a r i e s u n d e r t h e T r u s t Deed t o 
de f e n d a n t s . (Ex. ] ) 
2Two trust deeds were involved; one to defendants to secure 
an indebtedness of $82,950.00 (Ex. 1) , and one to Welby L. 
Bethers and Ellen L. Bethers to secure an indebtedness of 
$53,625.00. (See Ex. 16 Para. 2.) On II y the first Trust Deed (to 
defendants) is involved i n this acti on. 
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Under the terms of the Trust Deed Note and the General 
Pledge Agreement, Sunwest could obtain partial reconveyances of 
the property by either paying the sum of $6,912.50 for each lot 
released or by providing substitute collateral in the form of a 
time certificate of deposit. An escrow for the lot releases was 
established with Valley Title Company. (R. 224.) Defendants 
delivered 12 executed Requests for Partial Reconveyance to 
Valley Title and gave Valley Title full authority to release one 
lot for each $6,912.50 reduction in principal. (R. 218, 232; 
Ex. 6.) 
Valley Title thereafter released lots in accordance with 
the escrow arrangement. The determination of which lots were to 
be released was made by Sunwest without input from defendants. 
(R. 277-78.) Defendants generally were not notified of which 
lots were being reconveyed. (R. 220, 236-37.) 
The Trust Deed to defendants came due on July 1, 1981, but 
was not paid. (R. 278-79.) No further payments were received 
subsequent to August 14, 1981, at which time the unpaid principal 
balance was $13,253.87. (R. 279-80.) 
The dispute in this action centers over Lot 1. Sunwest 
initially sold Lot 1 to Norman Anderson, and it was subsequently 
conveyed to Mr. & Mrs. Martin in a transaction apparently 
financed by Trans-America Mortgage Company. (R. 175 Para. 8.) 
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Valley Title's records indicate that it received $9,267.50 from 
Reid National Title for a payoff on Lot 1 (R. 227; Ex. 4), that 
Valley Title paid the amount of that payoff to Sunwest (R. 224; 
Ex. 3), and that a Certificate of Deposit in the name of Sunwest 
was apparently purchased by Sunwest and held by Valley Title. 
Valley Title did not, however, issue a reconveyance of Lot 1. 
Notwithstanding the fact that no reconveyance had ever been 
issued for Lot 1, plaintiff issued a mortgagee policy to Trans-
America insuring Trans-America as having a first Deed of Trust 
on Lot 1. (R. 175 Para. 8.) Trans-America subsequently made 
demand on plaintiff to clear the title to Lot 1 pursuant to its 
mortgagee policy. Plaintiff in turn inquired of Valley Title to 
learn why Lot 1 had not been released. (Ex. 7.) Valley Title 
informed plaintiff's attorney that Valley Title had received a 
check dated January 30, 1981, designated as a payoff for Lot 1, 
which was to have been exchanged for a Certificate of Deposit. 
Valley Title further informed plaintiff's attorney that it had 
issued a partial reconveyance on Lot 5 rather than Lot 1 pursuant 
to an agreement apparently reached between defendants and Sunwest 
principal, Mr. Crockett. Finally, Valley Title advised 
plaintiff's attorney that Lots 1 & 2 had not been released and 
that the balance owing to defendants was equal to the payoffs 
for those two lots. (Ex. 8, copy attached as Appendix "C".) 
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After receiving the above information, plaintiff issued a 
check to Valley Title payable to defendants for $9,582.60 and 
requested a reconveyance of Lot 1. (R. 176 Para. 13; Ex. 9.) 
The check was tendered without protest and without any 
reservation of rights. There is no evidence that plaintiff had 
made any prior demand for reconveyance of Lot 1 to either Valley 
Title or defendants. Upon receipt of the payment, defendants 
executed a Request for Reconveyance of Lot 1 and Valley Title 
issued a reconveyance. (R. 237.) Plaintiff thereafter commenced 
this action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to the terms of a trust deed note, defendants 
released from the trust deed one lot for each specified principal 
payment received. Defendants never received any payments 
without making a related release of one lot. Defendants had no 
knowledge of nor control over the handling of the payment in 
which plaintiff relies, and the evidence supported the trial 
court's findings that that payment was not for Lot 1 as far as 
defendants were concerned. 
The parties whose rights plaintiff claims through 
subrogation were not entitled to compel defendants to release 
Lot 1. Plaintiff bargained for the release of Lot 1 with full 
6 
knowledge of the relevant details, and received what it bargained 
for. 
Plaintiff may not raise the claim of mutual mistake for the 
first time on appeal. 
This appeal is frivolous and defendants are entitled to 
their costs and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CLEARLY PREPONDERATE AGAINST 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) permits the Court, in a non-jury 
action, to dismiss the action at the close of the plaintiff's 
case if the plaintiff has not made a persuasive showing of his 
right to relief. The purpose of this rule is to permit the 
trial court to weigh the evidence and to dismiss the case if the 
court has not been persuaded that the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 
(Utah 1985). The plaintiff's evidence will generally be 
uncontroverted on a Rule 41(b) motion, because the defendant has 
not presented his case. The Court may nonetheless reject the 
plaintiff's evidence if the witnesses are unbelievable or the 
evidence otherwise insufficient. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 
311 (Utah 1983). 
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On appeal, the findings and judgment of the trial court are 
accorded the same presumption of correctness as if the entire 
presentation of both sides had been heard. Lawrence v. Bamberger 
Railroad Co, . 3 Utah 2d 247, 250-51, 282 P.2d 335, 337 (1955). 
Although this is an equity case and this court has the 
prerogative to review questions of fact as well as of law, this 
court has frequently stated that it will uphold the trial court 
if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the trial 
court's findings, and will reverse the trial court's findings 
only when the evidence clearly preponderates against them. Parks 
Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 
(Utah 1982). These principals were recently restated by this 
court as follows: 
Under familiar rules of appellate review, the 
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the judgment of the trial court, and the findings 
of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there 
is no substantial record evidence to support them. It 
is incumbent upon the appellant to marshall all of the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
to then demonstrate that even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the factual determination made by the 
trial court, that the evidence is insufficient to 
support its findings. 
Harline v. Campbell, 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5 (1986). 
Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof on appeal. 
Plaintiff's case is purportedly brought on a theory of unjust 
8 
enrichment.3 The elements of unjust enrichment were stated by 
this court as follows: 
Unjust enrichment occurs whenever a person has 
and retains money or benefits that in justice and 
equity belong to another. Thus, in order for a claim 
based on unjust enrichment to be successful, there 
must be (1) a benefit conferred on one person by 
another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefits without payment of its 
value. 
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P. 2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (citation 
omitted). 
Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment appears to be based 
on the following alleged sequence of events: (1) Lot 1 was sold 
to Norman Anderson and a payment designated as the payoff for 
Lot 1 was given to Valley Title, but Valley Title did not record 
a reconveyance of Lot 1. (2) Valley Title paid the amount of 
the payoff to Sunwest, which Sunwest used to purchase a 
Certificate of Deposit which was held by Valley Title. (3) The 
Certificate of Deposit was ultimately cashed, and the proceeds 
paid to defendants. (4) Plaintiff was not aware of the above 
sequence of events at the time it made a payment to defendants 
3Point I of plaintiff's brief proports to establish unjust 
enrichment, yet states on page 11 that the basis for the claim 
of unjust enrichment is that plaintiff was mistaken when it made 
the payment to defendants. This claim of mistake is treated in 
Point III of this brief. 
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to obtain a release of Lot 1. (5) Defendants were paid twice 
for Lot 1. 
The evidence at trial, however, viewed in the light most 
favorable to defendants, supports the trial court's specific 
findings that the initial check received by Valley Title was not 
for the release of Lot 1 as far as defendants were concerned, 
that the defendants did not receive any payment for the release 
of Lot 1 prior to the payment from plaintiff, that plaintiff 
was aware of all the relevant facts at the time it made the 
payment to defendants, and that defendants were not paid twice 
for Lot 1. As it set forth below, the trial court's findings 
and judgment on these issues was supported by the evidence. 
With respect to the initial check received by Valley Title, 
the trial court specifically found as follows: 
The check from FMA Thrift & Loan, No. 29031 
dated August 7, 1981, in the amount of $9,563.38 was 
not for the release of Lot 1 from the Deed of Trust as 
far as the defendants are concerned. 
R. 192 Para. 16. 
The plaintiff did present evidence that Valley Title had 
issued a receipt to Reid National Title for a payoff of Lot 1, 
that Valley Title had issued a check to Sunwest which indicated 
that it was for the Norman Anderson payoff on Lot 1, and that the 
check had been used to purchase a Certificate of Deposit which 
was treated by Valley Title or Sunwest as substitute collateral 
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for Lot 1. Defendants did not, however, have any knowledge of 
these events. Valley Title generally gave no notification to 
defendants as to which lots were being paid off (R. 236-37), and 
the defendants kept no records of which lots had been released. 
(R. 220.) Defendants had no control over the Certificates of 
Deposit (R. 245-45) , and did not know how the Certificates of 
Deposit were handled by Valley Title4. (R. 219.) The 
determination of when and how the proceeds from a Certificate of 
Deposit were to be paid to defendants was made by Sunwest (R. 
258-59), and the directions as to which lots should be released 
also came from Sunwest. (R. 277-78.) 
The only evidence presented to the Court as to why Lot 1 was 
not released is that Valley Title determined, after a meeting 
with one of the defendants and a representative from Sunwest, to 
release Lot 5 rather than Lot 1. (Ex. 8.) There is no evidence 
4The evidence as to how Valley Title did handle the 
Certificates of Deposit was anything but convincing. Plaintiff 
presented, through Mark Hall, an officer of Valley Title, 
evidence that Valley Title had a manila envelope with notations 
on it concerning the various lots. (Ex. 5.) Hall did not keep 
the records and did not know who had made the notations but 
believed that the notations indicated when Certificates of 
Deposit were received as substitute collateral for the various 
lots. (R. 229.) Hall had no knowledge as whether certificates 
were actually placed in the envelope. (R. 232.) Copies of some 
of the checks used to make payments to defendants had lot 
references on them, others did not. (R. 236.) Certificates of 
Deposit were sometimes withdrawn by Sunwest, and sometimes a 
receipt was made of the withdrawal and sometimes no receipt was 
made. (R. 247-48.) 
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as to the circumstances surrounding that decision, and this court 
must assume that there was a lawful and valid reason for that 
determination. 
The evidence presented to the trial court, in summary, 
showed that defendants received the sum of $9,563.38 from Valley 
Title, but that the money was not earmarked nor specified as 
being related to any particular lot. Defendants had no knowledge 
of nor control over the chain of events which plaintiff now 
claims establishes that that money was a payoff for Lot 1. In 
exchange for the receipt of $9,563.38, defendants released Lot 5. 
After the receipt of that money and the release of Lot 5, Sunwest 
still owed defendant the sum of $13,253.87 plus interest, payment 
of which was secured by Lots 1 and 2. The amount of this debt 
was equal to the contractual payoff amounts for Lots 1 and 2. 
These facts do not establish unjust enrichment. Although 
defendants received a benefit in the payment of the money, they 
also incurred a detriment in the release of Lot 5. There was no 
net benefit conferred on defendants. Defendants had no knowledge 
or appreciation of the claims now made by plaintiff that the 
benefit defendants received may have been applicable to Lot 1. 
Finally, it was not inequitable for defendants to retain the 
benefit, where defendants received no more than that which 
12 
Sunwest had contracted to pay and the remaining balance due was 
equal to the release prices for the remaining two lots. 
Because the receipt by defendants of the initial payment of 
$9,563.38 in August, 1981, was proper, it follows that defendants 
were not unjustly enriched when they agreed to release Lot 1 at 
plaintiff's request in exchange for the payoff amount specified 
in the Trust Deed Note. The payment made by plaintiff did not 
constitute a double payment for Lot 1, as that payment was the 
first payment which defendants had received which was identified 
as being a payoff for Lot 1. 
It may be that plaintiff and the parties who purchased Lot 
1, taken together, may have paid twice for Lot 1. It may follow 
that someone was unjustly enriched through receipt of those 
payments. That someone may have been Sunwest which, in contrast 
to defendants, received a payment labeled as being for Lot 1 and 
had knowledge concerning the chain of events which plaintiff now 
claims shows that defendants received a payoff for Lot 1. The 
evidence presented at trial does not address these questions. 
The evidence does support, however, the trial court's judgment 
that defendants were not unjustly enriched, and the trial court's 
judgment should accordingly be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF RECEIVED 
WHAT IT BARGAINED FOR IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
13 
Point II of plaintiff's brief challenges the trial court's 
finding No. 21, which states: "The plaintiff received what it 
bargained for when it paid the sum of $9,563.38 to defendants 
and received therefore [sic] a reconveyance of Lot 1." (R. 
192.) Plaintiff's argument is apparently that plaintiff was 
subrogated to the rights of the purchasers of Lot 1, that those 
purchasers were entitled to have clear title pursuant to their 
Warranty Deeds, that defendants were already obligated to 
reconvey Lot 1, and there was therefore no consideration received 
by plaintiff in exchange for its payment of $9,563.38, because 
defendants did no more than that which they were already required 
to do. There are several fallacies with this argument. 
An initial fallacy with plaintiff's argument is in its 
assumption that defendants were obligated to reconvey Lot 1 
simply because the purchasers of Lot 1 had paid the full price 
for the lot. The problem with this assumption is that the 
purchasers did not pay any money to defendants, but rather 
made the payments to Valley Title and Sunwest. Point I of this 
brief establishes that, regardless of whether Sunwest and Valley 
Title may have received money which was designated as a payoff 
for Lot 1, the money which was ultimately received by defendants 
was not for the release of Lot 1 as far as the defendants were 
concerned. (R. 192 Para. 16.) 
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A second infirmity of plaintiff's argument is in its 
assumption that plaintiff acquired a right of action against 
defendants for a release of Lot 1 by reason of being subrogated 
to the rights of the purchasers of Lot 1. Assuming, arguendo, 
that plaintiff was subrogated to the rights of the purchasers, 
plaintiff thereby acquired only the rights which those purchasers 
had. Norman Anderson and his successors and interest may have 
had a right of action against Sunwest for a release of Lot 1, but 
would not have had a right of action directly against defendants 
because they had made no payment directly to defendants and did 
not have any contract with defendants. 
Assuming further, arguendo, that plaintiff was subrogated to 
whatever rights Sunwest had, the plaintiff would still not have 
been entitled to prevail because Sunwest had no cause of action 
against defendants. The trial court specifically found that 
"Sunwest II would not have been entitled to a reconveyance of Lot 
1 on October 25, 1984, without paying to the defendants at least 
the sum of $9,563.38." (R. 192 Para. 20.) This finding is 
supported by the evidence. Plaintiff's admitted at trial that 
defendants had not received any more than what they were entitled 
to receive under their contract with Sunwest, and that defendants 
had not been unjustly enriched if the entire transaction between 
Sunwest and defendants was viewed as a whole. (R. 288.) 
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Furthermore, it appears that the determination to release Lot 5 
rather than Lot 1 may have been made by mutual agreement of 
Sunwest and defendants, (Ex. 10.) 
In any event, even if plaintiff did have, as stated on Page 
16 of its brief, "the right to maintain an action against the 
defendants to validate, and resolve any problems dealing with, 
the title to the subject property for which the defendants may 
be responsible," the plaintiff waived those rights by making a 
voluntary payment without having first filed such an action. 
The applicable law has been stated as follow: 
The rule is well settled that a person cannot 
recover back money which he has voluntarily paid with 
full knowledge of all the facts, without fraud, 
duress, or extortion in some form. Thus, it is a 
universally recognized rule that money voluntarily 
paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with 
knowledge of the facts by the person making the 
payment, cannot be recovered back on the ground that 
the claim was illegal, or that there was no liability 
to pay in the first instance. This is true even 
though the payor makes the payment and expressly 
reserves his right to litigate his claim. 
66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 93 (1973). 
The evidence presented to the trial court clearly 
established that plaintiff's payment was voluntary. There is no 
evidence that plaintiff made any demand of any nature directly 
to defendants prior to making the payment. Plaintiff had full 
knowledge of all the relevant facts, in that it had been informed 
prior to making payment that Valley Title had received funds 
16 
designated as a payoff for Lot 1, but that Lot 5 was instead 
released following a meeting between one of the defendants and a 
representative of Sunwest. Although plaintiff may not have been 
aware of all the minute details of how Sunwest and Valley Title 
handled the amount initially received for Lot 1, there is 
no reason plaintiff could not have discovered those details 
prior to making the payment. Those details were, in any event, 
irrelevant, because defendants had no knowledge of nor control 
over those transactions. The evidence at trial established that 
plaintiff received what it had bargained for, and the judgment of 
the trial court must accordingly be affirmed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING MUTUAL 
MISTAKE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND THE 
CLAIM IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Point III of plaintiff's brief raises the issue of mutual 
mistake. Nowhere in plaintiff's Complaint (R. 1-4), in the 
Pre-Trial Order (R. 174-78), nor at trial was the issue of 
mutual mistake raised. Plaintiff is clearly precluded from 
raising this issue for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Hamilton. 44 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1986). 
Even if the issue of mutual mistake was properly before 
this court, it is plainly unsupported by the evidence. Plaintiff 
had received a letter from Valley Title setting forth the 
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essential aspects of the transaction prior to making the payment. 
(Ex. 8, copy attached as Appendix "C".) More importantly, there 
is no evidence that defendants were laboring under any mistake of 
fact. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF THEIR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR RESPONDING TO 
THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that this court may award just damages and single or double 
costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, where an appeal is 
frivolous. The rule further provides that the court may take 
appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately 
represents his client on appeal. 
Defendants respectfully submit that this appeal is 
frivolous, and that the error is compounded by the inadequate 
nature of plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff's appeal consists mainly 
of reargument of factual issues which the trial court determined 
adversely to plaintiff. Plaintiff cites very little legal 
authority in support of its contentions, and those authorities 
which are cited are mainly in support of relatively minor issues. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on its interpretation of certain 
exhibits which were offered in evidence, yet those exhibits were 
not attached to plaintiff's brief as required by Rule 24(f) of 
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the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is plainly 
frivolous, and defendants are entitled to be compensated for 
being required to respond to the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's 
action should be affirmed and defendants should be awarded their 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in responding to this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this (^ day of December, 1986. 
S. REX LEWIS and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing brief were mailed to the following, postage 
prepaid, this day of December, 1986. 
Gregory B. Wall 
Wall & Wall 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




October 10, 1984 
RE: Our Order #6569 
BeChers/Sunwest II 
75 SOUTH 200 EAST 
PROVO .UTAH 846013194 
PHON6 376-0900 
GREGORY B. WALL 
Suite 500 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dear Mr. Wall: 
This is in response to your letter of October 5, 1984 regarding the issuance 
of C.D.s to Mr. Glenn Bethers as payment on Lot 1, 
Estates Subdivision. 
Plat "A" Meadow Creek 
We have a check in our file dated January 30, 1981 Issued to Sunwest II for a 
payoff on Lot 1 that was to be exchanged for a C D . It is my understanding 
that at no time was a C D . ever issued directly to Mr. Bethers, but rather 
Sunwest II held the C.D«s until they matured, then gave the proceeds to Mr. 
Bethers, as previously agreed upon. These C.D.s were purchased by Sunwest II. 
I have been unable to determine where they were issued or negotiated. There 
are no copies of them in our file. 
Valley Title Company issued reconveyances on Meadow Creek Estates as directed 
by the beneficiary, Mr. Bethers. It appears that a partial reconveyance was 
issued on Lot 5 rather than Lot 1 at Mr. BeCher's instructions following a 
meeting between himself and Mr. Crockett. At present both Lots 1 and 2 are 
not yet released, and the balance owing Bethers is equal to the payoffs due 
for these two lots. 
We are very anxious to have these problems resolved« 
can be of further help. 
Sincerely, 
VALLEY TITLE COMPANY 
Please contact us if we 




S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
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GLENN L. BETHERS and TELLA 
MAE BETHERS, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 69,177 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the above-entitled Court 
on the 17th day of April, 1986. The plaintiff appeared by its counsel, Gregory B. 
Wall of Wall and Wall, and the defendants appeared by their counsel, S. Rex Lewis 
of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and the defendant, Glenn L. Bethers, appeared in 
person. The Court having heard the evidence presented by the plaintiff, both oral 
and documentary, whereupon the plaintiff rested its case. The defendants, pursuant 
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moved to dismiss the Complaint 
on the grounds that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff had shown no right to 
relief. After hearing oral argument of counsel, the Court granted the defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and directed the preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Based upon the evidence, the Court now makes the following: 
FINDTNGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff is a Texas corporation and has obtained a Certificate 
of Authority from the State of Utah and is thus authorized and permitted to maintain 
this action pursuant to the provisions of §16-10-120, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended. 
2. The plaintiff is further authorized by the State of Utah by and through 
its Insurance Commissioner to issue policies of title insurance and to generally 
engage in the business of title insurance in the State of Utah. 
3. The defendants are residents of Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. On June 7, 1978, the defendants, together with Welby and Ellen Bethers, 
entered into a written agreement with Sunwest II Development Corporation wherein it 
was agreed that Sunwest would purchase from Bethers land more fully set forth in the 
agreement, for the consideration and subject to the terms described therein. 
5. On June 7, 1978, the same parties, plus T. Michael Crockett and Harold 
M. Paulos, individually signed a Trust Deed which included and affected the subject 
property. 
6. Said Trust Deed was given as security for a Trust Deed Note dated June 
7, 1978, with the principal amount of $82,950.00 being all due and payable, together 
with interest, on the 1st day of July, 1981. 
7. As a part of the agreement between the parties, the defendants herein 
as holders agreed to reconvey title to one lot in the subdivision to be developed 
by Sunwest for each 56,912.50 principal reduction paid towards the note 
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8. Subsequent thereto, Lot 1 was sold by Sunwest II to Norman Anderson. 
Lot 1 was subsequently purchased by Tony Max Martin and Dale Martin, husband and 
wife, and plaintiff issued its mortgagee policy of insurance to Trans-America 
Mortgage Company insuring said Trans-America as having a first deed of trust on Lot 
1 and without mentioning the Deed of Trust of the defendants, which Deed of Trust 
was of record and prior of record to the deed of trust to Trans-America and was 
superior to the interest of the Martins. 
9. Trans-America Mortgage was charged with notice that no reconveyance of 
Lot 1 had ever been effected. 
10. On or about October 26, 1984, defendants received from plaintiff a 
check in the amount of $9,582.60. 
11. Said check was paid to the defendants by the plaintiff to obtain a 
request for reconveyance and the reconveyance of Lot 1 of the subject subdivision. 
12. The plaintiff at all times knew that the defendants would not request a 
reconveyance of Lot 1 unless they were paid the sum of $9,582.60. 
13. The plaintiff, prior to making the payment on October 26, 1984, to the 
defendants, had received a letter from Valley Title Company addressed to Gregory B. 
Wall dated October 10, 1984. 
14. The plaintiff has not tendered to the defendants a reinstatement of the 
Deed of Trust on Lot 1 as security for the obligation of Sunwest II to the defen-
dants. 
15. Plaintiff's claim is one based upon being subrogated to the rights of 
Trans-America Mortgage Company pursuant to the terms of its insurance policy. 
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16. The check from FMA Thrift & Loan, No. 29031 dated August 7, 1981, in 
the amount of $9,563.38 was not for the release of Lot 1 from the Deed of Trust as 
far as the defendants are concerned. 
17. The defendants have not been paid twice for the release of the subject 
lot. 
18. The principal balance that was due to the defendants from Sun west II 
on October 25, 1984, was the sum of $13,253.87, together with interest from August 
14, 1981. 
19. The real property that secured the balance as set forth in the proceed-
ing paragraph was Lot 1 and Lot 2, Plat "A", Meadow Creek Estates Subdivision, 
Provo, Utah. 
20. Sunwest II would not have been entitled to a reconveyance of Lot 1 on 
October 25, 1984, without paying to the defendants at least the sum of $9,563.38. 
21. The plaintiff received what it bargained for when it paid the sum of 
$9,563.38 to defendants and received therefore a reconveyance of Lot 1. 
22. The plaintiff obtained the reconveyance of Lot 1 by payment of $9,563.38 
to defendants knowing that it could not obtain a reconveyance voluntarily otherwise 
and without filing a legal action to attempt to compel a reconveyance. 
23. Trans-America Mortgage Company would not have had a right to compel the 
defendants to reconvey Lot 1 without paying money to the defendants for a reconvey-
ance. 
24. The defendants have not been unjustly enriched at the expense of the 
plaintiff. 
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25. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover the funds it has paid to the 
defendants under its policy of insurance with Trans-America Mortgage Company. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Complaint of the plaintiff should be dismissed with prejudice and 
the defendants awarded their costs herein. 
DATED this -3 7 <iav of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
GEORGE E/BALLIF 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to the following, postage prepaid, this / — day of May, 1986. 
Gregory B. Wall, Esq. 
Wall & Wall 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SECRETARY 
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GLENN L. BETHERS and TELLA 
MAE BETHERS, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 69,177 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the above-entitled Court 
on the 17th day of April, 1986. The plaintiff appeared by its counsel, Gregory B. 
Wall of Wall and Wall, and the defendants appeared by their counsel, S. Rex Lewis 
of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and the defendant, Glenn L. Bethers, appeared in 
person. The Court having heard the evidence presented by the plaintiff, both oral 
and documentary, whereupon the plaintiff rested its case. The defendants, pursuant 
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moved to dismiss the Complaint 
on the grounds that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff had shown no right to 
relief. After hearing oral argument of counsel, the Court granted the defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and directed the preparations of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. The Court having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint of the plaintiff be and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this %/ day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
GEORGE E. &ALLIF / f 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy oi the foregoing was mailed 
to the following, postage prepaid, this / "*"" day of May, 1986. 
Gregory B. Wall, Esq. 
Wall & Wall 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SECRETARY 
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